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Abstract: Sri Lanka was badly affected by the tsunami that occurred on 26th December 2004. The tsunami destroyed about two-thirds of the Sri Lankan coastline and 
affected more than 1,000,000 people. It does not only affected the lives of the community, but also had a devastating effect on their housing and livelihoods. The 
overall loss of 100,000 or more houses due to the tsunami proved to be a major challenge to the emergency response teams and disaster planners. Although several 
major disasters of varying magnitudes have occurred in the world, the body of knowledge related to post-disaster housing reconstruction and rehabilitation appears 
fragmented and poorly integrated. This paper attempts to fill this theoretical gap by focusing on the extent to which good practice knowledge transfer helps in 
overcoming this problem for more effective and efficient delivery of post-tsunami housing in Sri Lanka. The paper applied knowledge transfer principles within the 
context of the two housing reconstruction strategies employed in post-tsunami housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka; namely donor-driven housing and owner driven 
housing. The results of this study reveal that the knowledge transfer within this context cannot be simply copied and inserted from one context without any 
localisation. Therefore, the paper proposes a high-level abstraction of the core principles of community engagement through participatory techniques associated 
with appropriate capacity and capability building techniques that will enable the various stakeholders to create a new application to suit the appropriate context of 
the transfer destination (post-tsunami context in Sri Lanka). 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The December 2004 Asian tsunami disaster affected many 
countries such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, India and a 
few other countries in the region. The tsunami has led to  
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an unprecedented loss of life, reportedly more than 35,000 
people were killed in Sri Lanka causing severe damage to 
built environment structures as well as the productive assets 
and livelihoods of people such as fishing, agriculture, farming 
and tourism related activities in 13 districts. It also resulted in 
the loss of more than 100,000 houses. For a country such as Sri 
Lanka whose natural rate of house building is as low as 4000–
5000 per annum (Manatunga, 2005), the loss of 100,000 houses 
within a few hours proved a significant challenge for the 
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process of post-disaster reconstruction and recovery. To add 
to this, the post-tsunami rehabilitation operation has been 
affected due to weak local government institutions whose 
response capacities to deal with a natural catastrophe such 
as a tsunami are very poor (UNEP, 2005). The Sri Lankan 
emergency response teams faced some unique problems 
and dilemmas in post-tsunami housing reconstruction. Firstly, 
there were extreme shortages of materials and labour for 
construction that fuelled inflationary increases in the whole of 
the construction sector. Secondly, there were too many 
external actors (international aid agencies and relief 
organisations) trying to expedite the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation process and thirdly, there were many 
settlements within the affected areas which did not adhere to 
planning and building regulations. 
 
 Although more than three years have passed since the 
tsunami, Sri Lanka is yet to fully recover from the effect of the 
tsunami and a number of people still live in temporary shelters. 
Despite the above mentioned unique challenges, the Sri 
Lankan disaster response teams appear to have confronted 
the challenge of the fragmented and poorly integrated 
nature of the body of knowledge related to post-disaster 
housing reconstruction and rehabilitation. Therefore, the main 
focus of the paper is to investigate whether potential sharing 
of good practice and knowledge across various post-disaster 
housing re-construction and rehabilitation schemes in various 
parts of the world could have led to more effective and 
efficient delivery of post-tsunami housing in Sri Lanka.  
 
 The paper raises the following specific research question 
for purposes of investigation. 
 
To what extent would existing good practice knowledge 
(related to post-disaster housing construction) contribute 
towards effective and efficient delivery of post-tsunami 
housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka? 
 
 We can divide this broad research question into the 
following two categories: 
 
(i) Factors and the context prevailing within documented 
case histories; and 
(ii) Evaluation of the existing post-tsunami housing 
construction strategies in Sri Lanka and the potential for 
facilitating good practice knowledge transfer.  
 
 The paper is organised as follows. First, a review of 
literature on impact of natural disasters on housing, post-
disaster housing reconstruction process, various housing 
reconstruction strategies in use and good practice knowledge 
transfer in the context of post-disaster reconstruction is carried 
out. The next section sets out the main research question of 
the study. Then the paper sets out the methodology adopted 
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and discusses the previously documented case histories and 
survey results. Finally, the conclusions are drawn. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Impact of Natural Disasters on Housing and Overview for the 
Post-Disaster Housing Reconstruction Process 
 
The World Bank estimates that, in 1998, various natural 
disasters killed over 50,000 people and destroyed $65 billion 
worth of property and infrastructure (Ofori, 2004). This number 
significantly increased in 2004 due to the tsunami. South Asia 
Disaster Report (2006) states that the 2004–2005 period was 
the ''most appalling'' period in the history of South Asia. The 
report suggests that in addition to the tsunami, nearly 75,000 
people died due to the earthquake in the Himalayan region 
and rendered nearly 2.3 million people homeless in the 
Kashmir region. Natural disasters can impose drastic 
consequences both directly and indirectly on people’s lives 
and their livelihoods. Ofori (2004) explains the significance of 
the problem particularly in developing countries by identifying 
how destruction of housing can affect the community. First, 
many houses in developing countries are used by families for 
income generating activities (livelihoods). Second, a house 
represents several times each person’s annual income, and it 
might be impossible for the owner to replace it. Third, there 
are usually no suitable commercial insurance schemes to 
recover any financial losses. These factors indicate the severity 
of the problem as destruction of housing represents the 
greatest material loss (Johnson et al., 2006) to the people in 
many affected areas.  
 
 
 However, disasters are considered as open windows of 
opportunity for creating more resilient communities. Achieving 
resiliency in a disaster context means the ability to survive 
future natural disasters with minimum loss of life and property, 
as well as the ability to create a greater sense of place 
among residents; a stronger, more diverse economy; and a 
more economically integrated and diverse population (Vale 
and Campanella, 2005 cited in Berke and Campanella, 2006). 
Having identified such development opportunities, the 
reconstruction bodies begin the process of determining 
specific actions that can move it forward. One practical 
approach to developing the plan is to draft the plan based 
on a consensus view of its members regarding priority actions. 
Alternatively, they might consider convening groups of 
stakeholders associated with each specific issue (for example, 
groups of farmers and fishermen who lost their livelihood) to 
brainstorm on possible actions addressing that issue. Tapping 
into the knowledge of several stakeholder groups which are 
involved with the sector being considered enables more 
community members to participate in plan formulation and 
ensures that the broadest possible set of actions are identified 
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(EPC-India and TCG International-Washington, 2004). Thus, 
people who are affected by natural disasters are often 
strongly motivated to get back into the pre-disaster social 
networks by getting re-connected with the previous 
livelihoods so that they can carry on the economic activities 
(Olshansky et al., 2006) and get back to normalcy. Therefore, 
there is a natural tendency for both people affected as well 
as various other policy makers to jointly work towards 
reconstruction of housing and re-establish livelihoods, within 
the areas where the affected community lived prior to the 
disaster. 
 
 Set against this backdrop, the emergency response 
teams when faced with disasters, particularly in developing 
countries, quickly ''swing into action'' to provide quick fixes 
that are not necessarily resilient1  to further disasters 
(Johnson et al., 2006; Cuny, 1983). Due to the urgency 
and scale of relief and reconstruction operations, the 
special needs of particularly vulnerable groups are often 
overlooked and participation in general can be minimal, in a 
context where considering the needs of differing groups is  
 
 
1  Concept of resilience has a meaning that encompasses the whole 
community rather than the physical infrastructure (e.g., housing in the 
context of this paper). The definition of resilience has moved from being 
termed as the ability of the community to recover following the impact of a 
disaster (Fox, 2002) to a more emergent and proactive behaviour, which is 
improvised and adaptive based on the disaster situation (Dynex, 2003). 
vital during planning and implementing relief and 
reconstruction activities (Gunasekara, 2006). These quick fixes 
are provided at the cost of formalising and implementing a 
gradual process of systematic decision-making and up-front 
planning through participatory approaches. While expedient 
response is critical to the well-being of the community, the 
longer-term effectiveness of well thought through processes 
cannot be discounted. 
 
 A review of literature reveals the existence of various 
disaster management plans and processes. Of interest to the 
subject of this paper are specific plans and models for post-
disaster housing rehabilitation and reconstruction. Quarantelli 
(1995) for instance, defines four stages of reconstruction and 
recovery plans for housing targeting immediate relief, 
immediate shelter, temporary housing and permanent 
housing. What is important in this process is the timing of each 
of the stages. Johnson et al. (2006) who used the four-stage 
framework in the context of post-disaster housing construction 
after earthquakes in Western Turkey and Columbia found that 
the process did not work according to the specified method, 
and instead the authorities were forced to employ several ad 
hoc measures. 
  
 Figure 1 incorporates the four-stage process of housing 
recovery with the practical limitations associated with 
providing disaster resilient housing and infrastructure, and the 
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speed of providing the solution (adapted from Johnson et al., 
2006). The first two phases address short-term solutions 
whereas the third and the fourth stages provide (ideally) 
medium to long-term orientated solutions. As Johnson et al. 
(2006) argues, post-disaster reconstruction is a process that is 
both comprehensive and involves cross-disciplinary 
contributions of a wide variety of stakeholders. As shown in 
Figure 1, the degree of resilience of the community affected 
increases with longer-term orientated solutions. However, the 
speed of providing the longer-term solution usually reduces 
due to various problems associated with availability of 
funding, social problems, economic problems and 
technological problems. The degree of funding allocated to 
each of the stages or solutions should be appropriately 
managed. Any mismanagement of any of the stages of 
housing provision will result in the community not being settled 
in permanent housing. Instead, some of the temporary 
housing might have to be converted to permanent housing as 
covered in Johnson et al. (2006). The model in Figure 1 will be 
used to study the transfer process of good practice 
knowledge from one context to another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reconstruction of Housing from a ''Good Practice Knowledge 
Transfer'' Perspective 
 
Generally, during chaotic situations, the information flow is not 
reliable, and may be mostly rumour that circulates. Even the 
government officials may not have timely and accurate 
information. This is partly because governmental decision-
making does not follow its usual procedure due to the 
urgency and pressure (Akçar 2001). Reconstruction following 
Immediate relief Short Term 
 
 
Immediate shelters Short Term 
  
Temporary housing Medium Term 
 
 
Permanent housing Long Term 
 
 
Figure 1. The Four-Stage Process of Housing Reconstruction 
and its Relationship with Resilience and Speed of 
Reconstruction (adapted from Johnson et al., 2006). 
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a natural disaster is a complicated problem concerning 
social, economic and technological aspects. Therefore, 
rational decision-making is the key to accelerating the 
reconstruction process and to improving the human 
settlement environment (Yaoxian, 2002). Reconstruction 
projects include some decisions which need to be made such 
as the kind of post-disaster houses to provide (temporary or 
permanent or both), the financing method, the procurement 
method and the type of construction (Dikmen, 2006). Dikmen 
(2006) reports that in Turkey, post-disaster resettlement 
projects generally resulted in refusal of new settlements by the 
people. According to the investigation conducted in Turkey, it 
was reported that new settlements were refused due to such 
failures in post-disaster reconstruction projects. Quick decisions 
and lack of user participation in early decision-making 
process have been identified as two main cause. Therefore, 
beneficiaries should be involved in the early decision-making 
process of post-disaster reconstruction works. Discussions with 
the beneficiaries will help decision makers to understand their 
needs and preferences, and also users will understand the 
reasons for the decisions taken (Dikmen, 2006). 
  
 The parties involved in the post-tsunami reconstruction 
process vary from the affected community at large to the 
community leaders, local authorities, service providers, the 
government and external actors. The external actors consist of 
various local and foreign relief organisations. External 
assistance was given in the form of financial and technical 
assistance. A majority of these external actors have complex 
rules pertaining to their involvement in the reconstruction and 
recovery process (e.g., the timing of disbursement of funds). 
According to Thompson (1995), the major role of the external 
actors in the process of disaster recovery was to transfer their 
knowledge on areas such as conducting damage surveys, 
preparation of building codes for hazard-resistant 
construction, education of local construction experts, building 
trade workers and labourers, organisation and management 
of reconstruction programmes, and future contingency 
planning efforts.  
 
 These external actor roles are very much pertinent within 
the Sri Lankan context as well. In Sri Lanka, the various actors 
in the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of housing 
while interacting closely with the local councils also realised 
the importance of engaging with the affected communities. 
As a result, they adopted various participatory techniques to 
engage with the communities and the community leaders in 
the process of knowledge transfer (Gopalakrishnan and 
Santoro, 2004). The key challenge of good practice 
knowledge transfer is how easily it is absorbed by the 
transferee. This depends on the absorptive capacity (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990) of the recipient and the appropriateness 
of the new context to receive the new knowledge. According 
to Lillrank (1995), the transfer process involves three variables. 
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They are the level of abstraction used in the process, the 
approach of actors involved in the process and the type of 
managerial content transferred.  
 
 As explained by Lillrank (1995), a low-level transfer 
provides low, abstraction amounting to copying or inserting a 
foreign practice without considering the appropriateness of 
context. A transfer process that involves high-level abstraction 
in contrast, transfers only the core abstract ideas and a new 
application is created to suit the appropriate context of the 
transfer destination. The level of abstraction is generally 
affected by the complexity of the system or idea to be 
transferred, and refers to arrangements that involve a high 
human component as a complex system that requires a very 
high level of abstraction. 
 
 Jeong et al. (2006) studied process improvement in the 
construction industry context and presented two opposing 
views of good practice transfer. One view is that borrowing 
something that has gained acceptance in other industries, 
rather than inventing a new solution, is easier to exploit (Towill, 
2003). The other view is that good practices originated from 
other industries are bound to be rejected on the basis of 
being in appropriate to a particular industry (such as 
construction) whose characteristics are, arguably, perceived 
as ''unique''. Further, Goh (2002) citing Zulzanski (1996) focuses 
on transferee characteristics and points out that a recipient's 
lack of motivation, absorptive capacity and retentive 
capacity can result in poor transfer of knowledge. 
  
 In the light of the above theoretical aspects related to 
good practice knowledge transfer, the next section looks into 
the experience of post-tsunami reconstruction of housing 
within the context of Sri Lanka. 
 
  
EXPERIENCE OF POST-TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING 
IN SRI LANKA 
 
This section presents the main strategies adopted in the 
reconstruction of permanent housing in Sri Lanka after the 
tsunami. The government devised two different strategies for 
permanent house building. The first strategy was known as the 
home-owner driven strategy, for those outside the buffer zone, 
all affected households that were able to demonstrate 
ownership to land were entitled to a grant by the state. Under 
this strategy, the government provided a cash grant of 
Rs.250,000 for a fully damaged house (in 4 instalments), and 
Rs.100,000 (in 2 instalments) for a partly damaged house.  In 
addition, several NGOs provided additional payments or 
provided labour, materials and general technical assistance 
to support families rebuilding their own homes. This strategy 
was also termed as ''assisted self-help'' by Johnson et al. 
(2006). 
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 The second strategy was known as the donor-driven 
strategy, which was mainly targeted at people living within 
the buffer zones attached to the coastal area who had to be 
relocated. Under this strategy, for those within the buffer zone, 
all affected families are entitled to a house built by a donor 
agency on land allocated by the state in accordance with Sri 
Lankan government standards. The donor provides each new 
settlement with an internal common infrastructure while the Sri 
Lankan government provides the services up to the relocation 
site. However, this buffer zone was changed in December 
2005 and the reduction in the buffer zone allowed some of 
the communities to repair or rebuild their own homes under 
the first strategy. The rest of the people living in buffer zones 
were allowed the above incentive, provided they build their 
home outside the buffer zone, but within the same district. 
Therefore, the home-owner driven strategy contributed to a 
significant number of new houses built as part of post-tsunami 
reconstruction in Sri Lanka. 
 
 The policy makers and the emergency response teams 
at the forefront of the reconstruction process faced several 
challenges, which resulted in concentrating more on short 
term solutions rather than more long lasting solutions. The 
production capacity of traditional building materials 
manufacturers, who were over stretched in terms of their 
production capacity even prior to the tsunami, could not 
meet  the new demand. Further, there were skills shortages 
particularly among the various building trade workers. These 
shortages fuelled price increases, which kick-started 
inflationary increases within the whole industry. Harris (2006), 
for instance, reports that the daily wage of a skilled mason or 
carpenter has risen from about Rupees 500 (£2.50) to about 
Rupees 1,000 (£5.00). These cost escalations affected some of 
the initial project feasibility studies carried out under owner- 
driven and donor-driven housing strategies.  
 
 The post-tsunami housing construction in Sri Lanka also 
created other problems that affected the balance of skills 
expertise of some of the construction companies. For 
example, Harris (2006:5) related how one organisation had 
been ''robbed'' of its operational capacity by the influx of 
international agencies. The company had been involved in 
the construction of transitional shelters and had both an 
extremely competent site planner and water/sanitation 
engineer on their staff. Within weeks of being awarded a 
project to construct hundreds of shelters, both of these staff 
members had been ''poached'' by international organisations, 
who were also involved in transitional shelter construction, but 
were offering salaries far greater than the other company 
could afford to match. 
 
 Further, some of the houses damaged and destroyed 
along the coastline as a result of the tsunami were occupied 
illegally prior to the tsunami. This resulted in difficulties in 
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establishing legal ownership of affected properties mainly due 
to the lack of documentation and illegal occupation. In 
addition, UNEP (2005) notes of pre-existing unplanned 
settlements in the southern part of the country, who had 
ignored the building standards. This was a major barrier in the 
reconstruction process. Houses belonging to some of the 
affected occupants, were ill-suited for less intense hazards 
such as strong winds or storms let alone tsunamis. These 
unique features prevalent within the context of post-tsunami 
housing reconstruction in Sri Lanka become strong 
determinants of good practice knowledge transfer. Some of 
these factors may have caused the process of reconstruction 
and rehabilitation of housing to slow down (lessening of the 
speed when moving from stage one to four as depicted in 
Figure 1). 
  
 Post-tsunami housing reconstruction (owner-driven and 
donor-driven housing) gathered momentum during its initial 
stages. This was mainly due to the motivation to provide 
immediate response to the affected community and the 
mobilisation of several relief organisations, whose internal 
policies and procedures forced expedient disbursement of 
funds to the government and affected community.  However, 
after more than two years, the overall situation in the country 
in terms of reconstruction of housing does not paint a good 
picture. The current status pertaining to owner-driven and 
donor-driver housing construction is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Housing Information (adapted from RADA, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
Temporary
Shelters 
 
Owner-
driven, 
Partially 
Damaged
(onsite) 
 
Owner-
driven 
Fully 
Damaged 
(onsite) 
 
 
 
Donor-
driven 
Relocation 
 
 
Original figures 
(revised in 
2006) 
 
 114,069 
  
 39,823 
  
 39,361 
  
 31,233 
 
Current usage/ 
completed 
  
 14,960 
  
 34,988 
  
 11,543 
  
 12,207 
 
 
Percentage 
usage/ 
completed 
 
  
13% 
  
 88% 
  
 29% 
  
 39% 
 
 The above figures indicate that 13% of the people 
affected still live in temporary shelters two years after the 
tsunami (figures as in December 2006). The owner-driven 
strategy for partially damaged housing seems to have 
progressed well with 88% completion. But the owner-driven 
strategy for fully damaged housing and the donor-driven 
programmes (based on relocation of families) have not 
worked as anticipated. The donor-driven and owner driven 
housing construction strategies are well established schemes 
of post disaster housing construction, specifically within the 
context of developing countries. Previous work in this area 
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(Johnson et al., 2006; South Asia Disaster Report, 2006; Asian 
Disaster Management News, 2006) has evaluated the 
effectiveness of various housing construction projects and 
how they fit in with socio-economic variables. However, there 
is a gap in the literature that looks into post-disaster housing 
reconstruction from the point of view of ''good practice 
knowledge transfer''.  This is confirmed by Mohanty et al. 
(2006) who drew upon knowledge management literature to 
argue that in disaster situations in practice, there are no 
processes currently available to get the appropriate 
knowledge at the right time. The purpose of this paper is to 
investigate this area within the developing country context (in 
Sri Lanka). 
 
 We propose the following methodology to conduct the 
above investigation. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
We adopted multiple approaches to investigate the stated 
research question. Due to the exploratory nature of the 
research, we first conducted a qualitative inquiry of previously 
documented case histories of post-disaster reconstruction of 
housing (after an earthquake). The objective of the first stage 
was to gain a deep understanding of its principles so that we 
can consider it as a candidate source for good practice 
knowledge transfer. Then, a questionnaire survey was carried 
out to gain an understanding of the effectiveness of post-
tsunami housing reconstruction programmes in Sri Lanka. The 
two techniques enabled us to investigate the appropriateness 
of potential good practice knowledge transfer in the context 
of post-tsunami housing reconstruction. In the third stage, we 
combined the primary data with principles of good practice 
knowledge transfer and post-tsunami housing reconstruction 
found in literature to focus on the various benefits, barriers and 
comment on the stated research question. We adopted this 
mixed method approach to improve the robustness of the 
research design. 
 
 We considered previously documented post-
earthquake housing construction case history data (Johnson 
et al., 2006) as a potential source of good practice 
knowledge transfer. The case-in-point in the documented 
case histories has been temporary housing, whereas in our 
study we considered temporary housing as a means to 
providing permanent housing and that temporary provision 
occupies an important place in the four-stage delivery of 
post-tsunami housing construction. Further, we took into 
consideration the unique opportunity of comparing the 
knowledge transfer aspects of post-disaster housing 
reconstruction during the aftermath of an earthquake with 
the aftermath of a tsunami. Although the types of disaster 
were unique in their own right, we were able to explore 
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various theoretical aspects of knowledge transfer related to 
post-disaster housing reconstruction. This qualitative inquiry 
also provided insights on the level of abstraction (whether 
high level or low level) of knowledge from one context to 
another based on Lillrank's (1995) study. The fact that the 
documented case histories and the intended field survey 
were from a developing country context (Columbia, Turkey 
and Sri Lanka) adds support to our chosen sample of 
documented case histories. 
  
 To gain an understanding of the applicability of some of 
the principles of post-disaster housing reconstruction, a 
questionnaire survey was conducted among the victims of 
the tsunami within Sri Lanka. In broad terms, the survey 
investigated the level of satisfaction of the victims on the 
ongoing housing reconstruction programme. This survey 
covered victims of the tsunami in general and concentrated 
on both the owner-driven and donor-driven housing as well as 
those living in transitional shelters and the homeless. The 
questionnaire was personally administered within the Galle 
district (a district in the southern province in Sri Lanka) among 
226 victims of the tsunami, as shown in Table 2. The sample 
was selected from the data provided by the local provincial 
council on tsunami victims and their housing provision. Galle 
district was significantly affected due to the tsunami and the 
226 victims in the sample represented a good cross section of 
the different types of permanent and temporary housing 
provisions. The victims also represented almost all the areas 
affected within the Galle district. The objective of this 
questionnaire survey was to investigate the perception of the 
victims of the tsunami disaster, based on criteria such as 
architecture/aesthetics, quality/strength and durability, 
functionality, space availability, agreeing to change the 
design as requested and degree of flexibility to make future 
changes.2 We were able to link the results of the survey to 
address the  initial research question raised in this research. 
 
 The survey sample was divided into victims who 
received donor-driven housing, owner-driven housing, 
transitional shelters and victims who received nothing as 
shown in Table 2. The sample consists of almost equivalent 
percentage of victims from houses built through main two 
categories; namely owner-driven houses and donor-driven 
houses. Three years after the disaster, 15% of victims still live 
in transitional shelters or have not received any shelter at all.  
The response was obtained in the form of the level of  
  
 
2 These criteria were included after a literature review covering user 
perspectives and levels of satisfaction expressed on various types of 
buildings. 
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satisfaction according to a scale of four levels of satisfaction 
(very dissatisfied to extremely satisfied) from victims who 
occupy donor-driven and owner-driven houses. The results are 
discussed in the next section in detail.  
 
Table 2.  Sample Selection of Tsunami victims Based on the Housing 
Programme 
 
Type of Housing Programme Number of Victims 
Surveyed 
 
% 
Houses built under donor-driven 
housing programme 
96 42% 
Houses built under owner-driven 
housing programme 
97 43% 
Transitional shelters 11 5% 
No house or transitional shelters 22 10% 
Total 226 100% 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The discussion is based on the two parts of the research 
question raised in the literature review. The case history results 
together with the questionnaire survey results helped to gain a 
broader understanding of potential avenues for good 
practice transfer from one context to another. This section 
then comments on the broader research question set out in 
the study.  
 
 
Factors and the Context Prevailing within Documented Case 
Histories and the Potential for Good Practice Knowledge 
Transfer 
 
The documented case histories are related to two post-
earthquake housing reconstructions in Turkey and Columbia. 
The main factor that distinguished the two housing provisions 
was the nature of decision-making by the policy makers (see 
Figure 2). Within the context of Turkey, the decision-making  
process was centralised, whereas in Columbia, it was more 
decentralised and several participatory approaches were 
devised to engage with the community that was affected by 
the earthquake disaster in arriving at the various housing 
solutions. Figure 2 maps out the two decision-making 
processes and their effects within the contexts of Turkey and 
Columbia. 
 
In the case of Western Turkey, the post-disaster management 
process faced problems from the beginning, mainly due to 
the lack of engagement with the directly affected community 
(Johnson et al., 2006). The decision makers did not adopt any 
participatory approaches in generating the potential  
temporary housing solutions as depicted in Figure 2 
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Centralised Decision Making 
(Western Turkey) 
 Inter-disciplinary Decision Making 
(Columbia) 
   
 
Temporary housing is criticized  
lacks of participatory  methods 
 
 
 
User made temporary shelters on 
invaded pblic or private land as a 
sulvival response 
 
 
 
  
 
Alleged that temporary housing 
siphoned funding from the 
permanent housing 
 
 
 
Temporary shelters in planned 
settlements 
 
 
   
 
Enlargement of areas requiring 
municipal services 
 
 
 
Dismanting the temporary housing 
was difficult as a lot people 
preferred to occupy them 
 
 
 
   
 
Earthquake damaged houses 
rented out as permanent 
housing did not get built 
 
 
 
People believed that temporary 
housing was too sophistacated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Earthquake damaged houses 
rented out as permanent 
housing did not get built 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of Two Post-earthquake Housing  
Construction Scenarios (adapted from Johnson et al, 2006). 
 
(Johnson et al., 2006). This may have created negative 
perceptions among the community on the delivery of 
temporary housing, which resulted in various disputes such as 
alleging that too much was spent on temporary housing. Lack 
of community engagement eventually resulted in the 
emergence of a lot of socio-economic problems within the 
community. In the case of Columbia, the process that 
followed was a participatory approach for decision-making. 
Although it was initially successful, the main problem was the 
investment allocated for temporary housing, which was out of 
proportion compared to the quality of temporary housing that 
was necessary under the circumstances. This resulted in 
temporary housing solution being pushed towards the more 
permanent housing category in Figure 1. In this instance, the 
community might have lacked the capability to understand 
the degree of sophistication required for the temporary 
houses. The policy makers and the rest of the stakeholders 
could have benefited some advice from the external actors 
on deciding the type and degree of sophistication of the 
temporary housing. Based on the four-stage model in Figure 1, 
the decision makers as a whole could have interacted with 
the experts in choosing of an appropriate temporary housing 
solution consistent with the duration (medium term nature of 
the solution). This would have reinforced the fourth stage 
permanent housing solution within the original plan and with 
the appropriate allocation of funds. 
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 Three principles emerged from these case histories that 
can be abstracted as good practice knowledge to another 
context. They are: (a) the lack of community participation in 
post-disaster housing; (b) Lack of capacity and capability 
improvement of the community to understand the degree of 
sophistication in the four-stage housing reconstruction process 
(Figure 1).  It is important to note that various techniques of 
participatory approaches could have enriched the decision- 
making process. The objective of participatory approaches is 
to gain some idea of the subtle dynamics of the community 
that is affected and gain a thorough knowledge of how the 
housing and people’s livelihoods are closely related. Any 
disconnection between the housing need and the people's 
livelihoods would result in possible failure of the housing 
solution. A significant part of this knowledge is not available in 
explicit fashion (as documents). This knowledge exists mainly 
as tacit knowledge and is embedded and grounded within 
the individuals’ and the communities’ behaviours and actions. 
For example, Empson (1999) refers to explicit knowledge as 
the ''tip of the iceberg,'' because a substantial part of the 
knowledge is tacit and hidden below the surface. Practical 
Action (2006) suggests various tools for participatory 
assessments as good practice information. Some of them are 
observation, semi-structured interviews, drama, role-play, 
diagrams and visual tools, mapping, and modelling of various 
scenarios. (For a full list of participatory tools – see Practical 
Action info pack, 2006).  
 Apart from principles (a) and (b) above, the 
documented case histories also demonstrate the need for 
upfront planning of investment during the four stages of 
housing reconstruction [principle (c)]. Expert knowledge on 
various financial and risk management models, and technical 
solutions for post-disaster housing could have contributed to 
more efficient financial and technical strategies being 
derived, so that the four-stage process (in Figure 1) could 
have resulted in appropriate permanent housing for the 
community. In both post-earthquake case histories, there 
seem to be inappropriate allocation of resources considering 
short to medium to long-term reconstruction of housing. 
 
 The next section evaluates the existing strategies 
adopted and the performance of post-tsunami reconstruction 
of housing in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
Evaluation of the Existing Post-Tsunami Housing Construction 
Strategies in Sri Lanka 
 
The questionnaire survey carried out in the Galle district 
identified the perspectives of the victims of the tsunami. These 
perspectives are compared with the three principles identified 
previously. 
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Lack of community participation in post-tsunami housing 
 
Figure 3 indicates the comparison of their responses based on 
the donor-driven and owner-driven housing schemes 
(detailed statistics are included in the appendix). The four-
level satisfaction scale (very dissatisfied to very satisfied) was 
combined into a two-level scale (satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction) in constructing Figure 3. 
 
 The comparison of respondents’ satisfaction on the two 
housing strategies in Figure 3 shows that the occupants of 
donor-driven housing were significantly more satisfied than 
occupants of owner-driven houses in the areas of aesthetics 
of the building, quality, durability and the functionality. 
However, the survey results also show that owner-driven house 
occupants were generally more satisfied than the donor-
driven housing occupants with respect to availability of space  
ability to influence design changes and affording flexibility to 
perform future expansion of the house. The main cause for this 
comparatively lesser satisfaction is that it falls short in meeting 
the communities’ subtle demands related to dynamics of life 
and particularly understanding how their livelihoods are 
connected to the types and location of housing. In simple 
terms, lower satisfaction level tends to be an indication of 
lower community participation through which softer needs of 
the people do not seem to have been addressed. In owner-
driven housing, owners have the opportunity of identifying 
their needs and engage in various community participatory 
schemes and indicate their preferences in relation to 
parameters such as space, design changes and flexibility for 
future expansion. Thus, Figure 3 provides insights into less 
community were engagement in donor-driven housing 
construction compared to owner-driven housing. For 
example, most of the male members of the affected 
community were engaged in fishing and it was found that 
several of these families had to disengage with their day-to-
day employment due to the location of their new housing 
(donor-driven), which was too far away from the coast where 
their fishing boats and other equipment were located. 
Furthermore, South Asia Disaster Report (2006: 38) states that 
"coastal women in Sri Lanka traditionally engaged in… home 
based activities such as processing coir from coconut 
husks…and other craft based work.'' Some of these houses 
were not appropriate in meeting needs of the activities of 
these women. Therefore, as highlighted by Ofori (2004), 
houses and livelihoods have a strong interconnection, hence 
the poor satisfaction score related to space, current design 
and future flexibility of the donor-driven houses.  
 
The community engagement and adoption of participatory 
approaches were not adopted within donor-driven strategy 
to the same extent as owner-driven strategy. An effective 
localised housing solution using a high level of  
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Figure 3. Comparison of the Level of Satisfaction of Owner-driven 
and Donor-driven Housing (Galle district, Sri Lanka). 
 
durability and sustainability in accordance with the 
community needs did not seem to emerge from the donor-
driven strategy (see Lillrank, 1995). The  donor-driven housing 
was said to be a more sustainable solution compared to 
owner-driven housing. For instance, most donors specify 
environmental policy guidelines (e.g., the International 
Committee of the Red Cross – ICRC does not allow the use of 
asbestos and coconut rafters in buildings that receive their 
funding). The supervision of donor-driven housing construction 
was also very effective, resulting in cost control and timely 
completion. 
 
 
Lack of capacity and capability improvement of the 
community to understand the degree of sophistication in the 
four-stage housing reconstruction process  
 
Owner-driven houses proved better value for money as the 
affected community participated throughout the building 
process (there was also very little red-tape in the process as 
there was no tendering or selection of contractors). 
Furthermore, active engagement of families was seen as a 
positive developmental approach to reduce some of the 
dependency created by the tsunami. However, a major 
shortcoming related to the principle of good practice transfer 
in this housing strategy was that although the community 
requirements related to housing was well assessed and 
understood, their capacity to achieve the requirements was 
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not evaluated. As part of a process of empowering the 
affected community, funds were disbursed to the people to 
build their houses, which the people found very difficult to do, 
as they did not possess the requisite capability. For instance, 
according to Mugalan (2006), some professional and 
technical support was required at various stages of this 
housing strategy, as many families did not have individual 
capacities to rebuild their own houses. This process was not 
formalised to the extent it should have been, as the requisite 
expertise was in short supply. These were the causes of 
significant shortfall in the reconstruction of fully damaged 
housing through the owner-driven scheme compared to the 
partially damaged ones (see Table 1). The people whose 
capacity and capability to manage the reconstruction of 
partially damaged houses seem to have been at a 
satisfactory level, hence the achievement of 88% completion 
(see Table 1). Due to the duration of the construction of fully 
damaged houses, the disbursement of instalment payments 
was not managed properly. Some occupants chose to 
reduce the specified building components to save money. 
This is reflected in the satisfaction level statistics in Figure 3, as 
people believed that they have compromised aesthetics, 
quality, durability and functionality to achieve cost 
effectiveness, appropriate design and flexibility.   
 
 
Lack of upfront planning across the four-stage housing 
reconstruction process  
 
Both the owner-driven and donor-driven schemes were 
introduced as permanent solutions for post-tsunami 
reconstruction activities in Sri Lanka. Therefore, the degree of 
upfront planning exercised within the context of tsunami 
affected community in the Galle district was more 
comprehensive compared to the documented case histories. 
The housing provision in the documented case histories was 
geared towards temporary shelters as opposed to permanent 
housing. Thereby, the decision makers, both within the context 
of Turkey and Columbia were more interested in providing 
immediate relief to the victims, and hence the aim of upfront 
planning and financial provision across the four-stage 
reconstruction process was different to the context of the 
survey done in Sri Lanka.   
 
Comment on the Research Question and Limitations of the 
Study  
 
The analysis of documented case histories and survey results 
indicate that the two abstract principles related to post-
disaster housing can be transferred from one context to 
another. The first principle of community engagement was 
seen as extremely critical to the success of the housing 
strategy, as the knowledge on the relationship between 
housing and livelihood is extremely subtle and context 
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dependent, and a significant proportion of this is tacit 
knowledge. Several examples in the post-tsunami housing 
construction indicated that, while reconstruction of housing in 
a manner that is resilient to various disasters is important (as 
proven by the donor-built strategy), it should not drastically 
affect the livelihoods of people (as indicated by the levels of 
satisfaction between the two strategies). The second principle 
of capacity and capability improvement for the community is 
also important so that the participatory approaches can be 
deployed not only to get back to normalcy, but also to 
produce more imaginative and creative solutions to ''build 
back better'' (South Asia Disaster Report, 2006). The third 
principle of upfront planning and finance across the four 
stages is important as it results in equitable allocation of 
resources during the life cycle of rehabilitation and   
reconstruction after a disaster. These three principles of good 
practice knowledge transfer are abstract ideas, which need 
to be localised depending on the particular context, in this 
case, post-tsunami housing re-construction in Sri Lanka.  
 
 According to the overall research design, multiple 
approaches were adopted to address the initial research 
question. The analysis of documented case histories was later 
compared and contrasted with the survey of tsunami victims 
on their level of satisfaction on various types of housing 
provisions, the degree of participation, capacity and 
capability and financial investment across the post-disaster 
 
housing provision. The field research of this study was confined 
to the survey of the tsunami victims within the Galle district, 
which is a limitation of this research. We anticipate 
conducting further research by extending the chosen sample 
to include multiple stakeholders such as various types of 
donors (NGOs and government institutions), community 
based organisations and other institutions that supply 
technology and services. We also anticipate covering a wider 
geographical area of Sri Lanka (as the Galle district was one 
of 13 districts that was affected due to the tsunami) to gain 
further insights into knowledge transfer. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
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Post-disaster reconstruction is an area that is gaining 
increased attention by many governments, environmental 
campaigners, scientists and various other stakeholders, both in 
the developing and the developed world. Along with the loss 
of life resulting from various disasters, loss of housing marks a 
major impact due to the multiple effects of psychological, 
physiological and economic damage that it creates. The 
December 2004 tsunami destroyed more than 100,000 houses 
in Sri Lanka and, as yet, not managed to fully recover from this 
loss. Although disasters of similar magnitudes occur in many 
parts of the world, which impact on a country’s housing stock, 
the knowledge relating to post-disaster housing seems to be 
fragmented and there seems to be a dearth of literature in 
Exploring Good Practice Knowledge Transfer  
the area of transferring good practice knowledge on post-
disaster housing reconstruction. This paper focused on how to 
transfer effective good practice knowledge from one context 
to another. The paper studied documented case histories in 
the context of post-earthquake housing reconstruction, and 
investigated the potential of emerging good practice 
knowledge that could be transferred towards effective and 
efficient delivery of post-tsunami housing reconstruction in Sri 
Lanka. 
 
 We initially learned lessons by evaluating two 
documented case histories that indicated the use of an 
effective model for housing reconstruction during the 
aftermath of a disaster. The essence of the framework (Figure 
2) is the emphasis on high level abstraction of core principles 
and localising within the post-disaster context. Then, a survey 
was conducted among the victims of the tsunami disaster to 
investigate their level of satisfaction in their housing provision. 
The survey was limited to the tsunami victims in the Galle 
district of Sri Lanka. It was decided to limit the scope of the 
survey so that we were able to cover a wide range of 
reconstruction solutions from temporary shelters to more 
permanent housing, and investigate the levels of satisfaction 
from the perspective of the tsunami victims in more detail. The 
depth covered in the survey was extremely useful in focusing 
on the four-stage process of reconstruction (see Figure 1). 
Therefore, the overall lessons learned from this study can be 
 
applied to cover all three principles of knowledge transfer 
identified and discussed in the previous section. However, the 
possible limitation of the survey in not having adequate 
breadth will be addressed through future research. As further 
research, the authors recommend that this study to be 
widened to cover knowledge transfer perspectives of multiple 
stakeholders such as international donor perspectives of 
multiple stakeholders such as international donor 
organisations, non governmental organisations, community 
based organisations and other technology/knowledge 
suppliers linked to various post-disaster reconstruction and 
rehabilitation contexts. Such a study will enable us to gain 
insights on multiple knowledge flows between various 
stakeholders. 
 
 The results of this study supported the principle of high 
level abstraction of core principles of housing reconstruction 
and localising within the post-disaster context as evidenced 
by the higher level of satisfaction expressed by the victims of 
tsunami who were part of the owner-driven strategy (see 
Figure 3). The survey results indicated that in the case of the 
owner-driven strategy, the people engaged effectively in 
generating their needs in terms of parameters such as space, 
design and flexibility for future expansion. The ideal solution 
might have been a compromise between the needs of the 
people (the main stakeholders), functionality, sustainability, 
resilience and the budget available for reconstruction. 
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Therefore, the paper proposes the development of good 
practice knowledge on housing reconstruction (as high-level 
abstraction of the core principles of housing reconstruction) 
and localised community engagement as two important 
goals of knowledge transfer. The study does not only 
contributes to the body of knowledge within post-disaster 
reconstruction, but it also relocates literature residing in the 
general body of good practice knowledge transfer within the 
context of post-disaster reconstruction.  
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Akçar, S. (2001). Grassroots Women’s Collectives Roles in post disaster 
effort: Potential for sustainable partnership and good 
governance (Lessons learned from the Marmara Earthquake in 
Turkey), Turkey. Presented to the UN-DAW ISDR Expert Meeting on 
"Enviromental Management and the Mitigation of Natural 
Disasters: A Gender Perspective", Ankara, Turkey, 2–6 November. 
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/env_manage/documents.
html. 
Asian Disaster Management News. (2006). Multi hazard early warning 
systems. Asia Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) newsletter,  
12(4), October – December 2006. 
Berke, P.R. and Campanella, T.J. (2006). Planning for post disaster 
Resiliency. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 604:192–207.  
 
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal D.A. (1990). ''Absorptive capacity: A new 
perspective on learning and innovation.'' Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 35: 128–152. 
Cuny, F.C. (1983). Disasters and Development. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Dikmen, N. (2006). Relocation or rebuilding in the same area: An 
important factor for decision making for post disaster housing 
projects. Proceedings of the International Conference and 
Student Competition on Post-disaster Reconstruction "Meeting 
Stakeholder Interests,'' Florence, Italy, 17–19 May. 
Disaster Management Centre, Ministry of Disaster Management. 
(2005). Towards a safer Sri Lanka: Road Map for Disaster Risk 
Mitigation, UNDP funded report, December 2005. 
Dynes, R. (2003). Finding order in disorder: Continuities in the 9–11 
response. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and 
Disasters, 21(3): 9–23. 
Empson, L. (1999). ''The challenge of managing knowledge (survey).'' 
Financial Times, 4 October. 
EPC-India and TCG International-Washington. (2004). Participatory 
Planning Guide for Post-Disaster Reconstruction, India.  http:// 
www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HD540.pdf (Accessed 10 March 
2008). 
Fox, A. (2002). Montserrat – A case study in the application of 
multiple methods to meet a post disaster housing shortage. 
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Post Disaster 
Reconstruction: Improving Post-Disaster Reconstruction in 
Developing Countries, Universite de Montreal, Canada, 23–25 
May. 
40/PENERIT UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA 
 
 
Exploring Good Practice Knowledge Transfer  
Goh, S.C. (2002). Managing effective knowledge transfer: An 
integrative framework and some practice implications. Journal 
of Knowledge Management, 6(1): 23–30. 
Gopalakrishnan, S. and Santoro, M.D. (2004). Distinguish between 
knowledge transfer and technology transfer activities: The role of 
key organizational factors. IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management, 51(1): 57–69. 
Gunasekara, A.J.R. (2006). Building capacity for sustainable and 
participatory post-tsunami rebuilding. International Conference 
and Student Competition on Post-Disaster Reconstruction: 
Meeting Stakeholder Interests, Florence, Italy. 17–19 May. 
Available online of www.grif. umontreal. ca/pages               
/papersmenu2006.htm (Accessed 10 December 2006). 
               
Olshansky, R.B., Johnson, L.A. and Topping, K. (2006). Rebuilding 
communities following disaster: Lessons from Kobe and Los 
Angeles. Built Environment, 2(4): 354–374. 
Harris, S. (2006). Disaster Response, Peace and Conflict in Post-
Tsunami Sri Lanka - Part 1: The Congestion of Humanitarian 
Space. Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace 
Studies, Working Paper 16. UK: University of Bradford. 
Jeong, K.S., Kagioglou, M., Haigh, R., Amaratunga, D. and 
Siriwardena, M. (2006). Embedding good practice sharing within 
process improvement. Engineering Construction and 
Architectural Management, 13(1): 62–79. 
Johnson, C., Lizzaralde, G. and Davidson, C.H. (2006). A systems view 
of temporary housing projects in post-disaster reconstruction. 
Construction Management and Economics, 24: 367–378. 
Lillrank, P. (1995). The transfer of management innovations from 
Japan, Organization Studies, 16(6): 971–989. 
Manatunga, R. (2005). Tsunami housing neconstruction: A major 
challenge, Daily News, 11 October. http://www.dailynews. 
k/2005/10/11 (Accessed 29 September 2006). 
 
Mohanty, S., Panda, B., Karelia, H. and Issar, R. (2006). Knowledge 
Management in Disaster Risk Reduction.  India: Ministry of Home 
Affairs. 
Mugalan. (2006). Sri Lanka: Post Tsunami Update Jan/Feb 2006 
[online]. http://www.geolanka.net (Accessed 29 September  
2006). 
Ofori, G. (2004). Construction Industry Development for Disaster 
Prevention and Response [online]. National University of 
Singapore. http://www.grif.umontreal.c/pages/i-rec%20papers/ 
ori.pdf (Accessed 27 February 2006). 
Practical Action info pack. (2006). Rebuilding homes and livelihoods, 
Practical action. http;//practicalaction.org (Accessed 29 
September 2007). 
Quarantelli, E.L. (1995). Patterns of shelter and housing in US disasters. 
Disaster Prevention and Management, 4(3): 43–53. 
RADA. (2007). News [online]. RADA: http://www.rada.gov.lk  
(Accessed 3 August 2007). 
South Asia Disaster Report. (2006). Tackling the tides and tremors. 
Islamabad, Pakistan:  Duryog Nivaran Secretariat. 
Thompson, P. (1995). Disaster Response [online]. Wisconsin, University 
of Wisconsin. http://dmc.engr.wisc.edu/courses/response/BB08-
03.html (Accessed 10 March 2006). 
Towill, D.R. (2003). Construction and the time compression paradigm. 
Construction Management and Economics, 21: 581–591. 
UNEP. (2005). Natural Rapid Environmental Assessment – Sri Lanka, 
UNEP Sri Lanka Country report – 2005. http://www.unep. 
org/tsunami/ (Accessed 10 March 2007). 
PENERIT UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA/41 
Bingunath Ingirige et al. 
 
Yaoxian, Y. (2002). Chinese experience with post-natural-disaster 
reconstruction. Proceedings of the First International Conference 
on Post-Disaster Reconstruction: Improving Post-Disaster 
Reconstruction in Developing Countries, Universite de Montreal, 
Canada, 23–25 May. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Level of satisfaction for post-tsunami housing (Donor-driven schemes) 
 
 Donor-driven 
Conditions  % of Victims 
Very 
Satisfied 
 
 
% of Victims 
Somewhat 
Satisfied 
 
% of Victims 
Somewhat 
Dissatisfied 
 
% of Victims 
Very 
Dissatisfied 
 
Architecture/ 
aesthetic 
 
49 
 
 49 
 
 5 
 
10 
 
Quality/strength and 
durabilit 
 
50   31   11  8 
 
Functionality 
 
44 
 
 32 
 
 14 
 
10 
 
Space availability 
 
34 
 
 27 
 
 20 
 
19 
 
 
Agreeing to change 
the design as 
requested 
 
 
23 
 
 
 24 
 
 
 19 
 
 
34 
 
 
Flexibility to do the 
necessary changes in 
the future 
 
 
46 
 
 
 265 
 
 
 18 
 
 
10 
 
 
Zulzanski, G. (1996). Exploring internal stickiness: Impediments to the 
transfer of best practice within the firm. Strategic Management 
Journal, 17(special issue):  27–43. 
 
 
 
 
 
Level of satisfaction for post-tsunami housing (Owner-driven 
schemes) 
 
 Donor-driven 
Conditions  % of Victims 
Very 
Satisfied 
 
 
% of Victims 
Somewhat 
Satisfied 
 
% of Victims 
Somewhat 
Dissatisfied 
 
% of Victims 
Very 
Dissatisfied 
 
Architecture/ 
aesthetic 
 
 3 
 
28 
 
 5 
 
 
 18 
 
Quality/strength 
and durabilit 
 
 7  26   39   
 28 
 
Functionality 
 
 10 
 
38 
 
 44 
 
 8 
 
Space availability 
 
 13 
 
61 
 
 25 
 
 1 
 
 
Agreeing to change 
the design as 
requested 
 
 
 24 
 
 
58 
 
 
 18 
 
 
 - 
 
 
Flexibility to do the 
necessary changes 
in the future 
 
 
 29 
 
 
51 
   
 18 
 
 
 2 
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